We study the role played by geographical distance in the peering decisions between Internet Service Providers. Firstly, we assess whether or not the Internet industry shows clustering in peering; we then concentrate on the dynamics of the agglomeration process by studying the effects of bilateral distance in changing the morphology of existing peering patterns.
Introduction
The dramatic reduction in communication costs taking place in the last decade induces a necessary reconsideration of both the notion and the role played by geographical distance in the process of agglomeration of the production activities. This is particularly true for digital goods, whose transport costs converged to zero.
In this paper we study the different effects played by geographical distance between providers within the Internet industry. We focus on the interconnection decisions between operators participating at Internet Exchange Points 2 (IXP) in Europe. The agreements can be classified into two main categories: peering and transit. Transit is a unilateral provider-tocustomer relationship, where the customer pays the provider in order to have its traffic packets sent anywhere in the Internet; instead, peering is a bilateral peer-to-peer relationship, where the networks exchange for free traffic directed to their own customers.
Our objective is twofold. Firstly, we assess whether or not the IXP-based Internet industry shows agglomeration in peering. Indeed, early studies show the presence of some form of agglomeration, inherited by previously existing industrial agglomeration for IT products. In order to do so we measure clustering indexes for peering agreements realized by different operators.
These clustering measures depict however static configurations only, a snapshot of spatial autocorrelation of the distribution of peering agreements (we also provide maps of these snapshots as a visual tool to assess clustering).
Our second objective focuses on the dynamics of the agglomeration process by studying the role played by distance in the formation of a peering relation. Indeed, the relationship between the industry structure and the interconnection outcome is bi-directional: the network structure (clustering, dispersion, randomness in the distribution of peering agreements) affects the role of geographical proximity on the formation of peering agreements, which, in turn, once established will redesign the network structure.
From a static point of view, our results consistently show the presence of spatial random pattern in the peering agreements distributions studied, i.e. no agglomeration. This result could be seen as an emergent equilibrium pattern from an underlying network formation game 3 . Given this result, we next assess the possibility for distance to still play a role in interconnection decisions, and hence to have a dynamic effect on the agglomeration structure.
In particular, we do this by estimating a binary model for both the IXPs displaying a random morphology and for the few exceptions showing on the contrary, either a clustered or a dispersed spatial configuration of their peering agreements.
Our analysis shows that the role of distance in affecting the probability of bilateral peering between ISPs is different depending on whether we consider an initially random 'equilibrium' pattern, a clustered or a dispersed one. In the first and third cases the distance is consistently negatively related to peering, suggesting the existence of localized positive externalities expressed in the form of mutual knowledge and reputation effects. On the contrary, in the case of a clustered pattern, the econometric analysis shows a positive relationship between the geographical distance and the likelihood of peering.
We interpret this sign change as showing a dominant centrifugal force, the prevalence of the positive effect of geographic differentiation, over the centripetal one due to localized externalities. In the long run, presumably this effect will lead to cluster breaking and the process will converge to the dominant random pattern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and motivates the role of agglomeration in the Internet, while Section 3 provides 3 For a survey of this literature see D' Ignazio and Giovannetti (2006) . an overview about the Internet structure and the interconnection agreements.
In Section 4 we analyze the morphology of peering within European IXPs; Section 5 complements the results obtained in the previous section by analyzing the determinants of bilateral peering decisions. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Agglomeration in the Internet
In one of the earliest contributions of the renewed debate on the geographical agglomeration of economic activity Krugman (1991) identified concentration as 'the most striking feature of the geography of economic activity'. More recently Fujita and Thisse (2002) described agglomeration as the interplay between two forces: localised positive externalities, which have a centripetal effect, and transport costs, which act as centrifugal force.
Since Marshall (1920) , agglomeration has been attributed to three forces: a pooled labour market, greater provision of non-traded inputs, and knowledge spillovers. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Schleifer (1992) stressed the importance of geographic proximity in defining the extent of knowledge spillovers within firms of a given industry to explain the agglomeration in cities. Following this approach proximity matters since a basic input for firms' activities, tacit knowledge, is assumed to be only transferable through face to face interaction: 'the transfer of information through modern transmission devices requires its organization according to some pre-specified patterns, and only formal information can be codified in this way ' (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p. 172) . As we argued before, the static analysis of the Internet morphology needs to be complemented by a dynamic study of the elements behind it. We achieve this by studying the effects of proximity for strategic decisions by Internet operators. Indeed, the Internet morphology is likely to affect interconnection decisions, which, in turn, affect the morphology itself. The key question hence becomes: does distance play a role in determining the interconnection decisions?
The role of proximity and face-to-face contact becomes more important as production processes become more fragmented and as firms have to rely on incomplete contracts, thus highlighting the importance of mutual trust (Spagnolo, 1999) . For example, Learner and Storper (2001) stress the relevance of face-to-face relations for the establishment of trust. This is particularly important for the Internet, where there is dominant asymmetric information involving the Operators performances and commitment. As discussed below, in the peering decision between ISPs there are substantial aspects of the transaction that are impossible to measure or monitor, so that the peering decision may require substantial trust and informal cooperation between peering partners. This may activate the centripetal force discussed above: face-to-face meetings and social connections may facilitate the governance of peering agreements, and the former may benefit from geographical proximity.
It is important to notice, however, that the face-to-face interaction is not the only, and not necessarily the best, way to transmit tacit knowledge or to enforce exchanges. Interaction can instead be developing in places, not spaces, whereby a place is a relational structure providing identification for the individuals belonging to it, hence it is characterized by 'insiderness' (Relph 1976, Place and Placeness from Dodge and Kitchin, 2000) . A place, following this view is not linked to a specific geographical location since the insiderness of, for instance, an online community will in fact define its borders, through affinity and cultural identification, dimensions, these, not often drawn in geographic space, particularly so if the place considered lies in cyberspace.
To become a sustainable alternative to geographically defined districts, the virtual ones will have to develop the ability to establish, maintain and Small Internet Service Providers (ISPs) rely on interconnections both among themselves and to larger networks for the delivery of their customers' data packets to their destinations outside the range of the ISP's own subscribers. The largest networks are called Backbones. These own or lease national or international high-speed fiber optic networks and deliver packets around the world for the many smaller networks connected to them. 5 The issue of the survival of geographical agglomeration when ICT becomes an efficient substitute of face-to-face dealings has been addressed by Santarelli (2004) . In a panel data analysis of the long term evolution of Emilia Romagna's industrial districts, he found that spatial concentration is no longer the most crucial factor in agglomeration and the term "multi-located" district describes recent forms of industrial agglomeration in a better way.
Interconnection Agreements
Two simple types of interconnection agreements have emerged to regulate traffic at exchange points between networks: transit agreements and peering agreements. In a transit agreement, a large network -the transit provideroffers access to the entire Internet to a smaller customer network against the payment of a fee often related to the capacity of the connection link. Being a member of an IXP also offers further advantages to an ISP: sharing of information and a free mutual technical help forum, possible elements towards forming insiderness of the virtual community of the Exchange members. However, it is important to recall that, for an ISP, being a member of an IXP does not imply also being able to peer with all other members.
Often, many ISPs are refused bilateral peering by other members of the same Exchange. This refusal to peer also implies that only a partial bilateral connectivity structure takes place at an IXP. This is represented with a peering matrix, displaying a value equal to one when two members peer and zero when they do not.
In the following we focus on the specific bilateral peering decisions between ISPs at IXPs, trying to understand their main drivers and focussing on the question of whether or not geographical proximity among the ISPs if affecting their peering choices at the Internet Exchange Points.
The Peering Decision
Earlier work has identified several factors and problems that may affect networks' decision whether and with whom to peer. A first, rather obvious factor is size. Peering requires establishing bilateral traffic exchange points, or peering points, which entail fixed and variable technological costs. It follows that a sufficiently intense traffic flow between the end users of the two networks is a necessary precondition for peering to be economically viable.
The larger two networks are, the more intense will be the traffic between their end users, and therefore networks' size is necessarily a determinant of the peering decision. In fact, almost all large backbone networks peer with each other, the traffic being exchanged at several interconnection points homogeneously distributed on the relevant geographical areas. Somewhat smaller networks also peer with networks of comparable size, but typically have to supplement their interconnection with transit agreements with backbone networks. Since the costs of setting up and maintaining peering points are usually shared equally by peering networks, unbalanced traffic implies an unbalanced distribution of gains from peering against a balanced distribution of costs. Such unbalanced situations have developed in some cases, and have led to the discontinuation of the peering arrangement and to its replacement with a transit one. Finally when two networks are peering and one of them is congested, the perceived speed of connection would not improve were the non-congested network to upgrade its infrastructure. And if the congested network chooses not to upgrade its infrastructure, it enjoys the full cost savings while it shares the reduced performance with all the networks it is peering with. This problem may of course induce caution in networks' decision whether and with whom to peer.
Agglomeration in Peering?
Little is known about the potential effects of ISPs' geographical location on their peering decision, the focus of our empirical analysis. Should we expect No clustering characterizes the number of peering agreements reached; in fact, the heights of the bars seem to be random and not depending upon the geographical position within the area of interest. This conclusion is also supported by the standardized Moran's 'I' statistic of spatial autocorrelation 7 of -0.157 (see Table 1 1. An IXP is clustered and distance has negative sign on peering then we can say that yes, the econometric analysis confirms that it is more likely to observe a clustered structure since further away ISPs do not tend to peer.
2. An IXP is clustered and distance has positive sign we can say that since the distributions of peering agreements per locality/headquarters is concentrated around a locality, headquarter distance has a positive added value for bilateral peering.
3. An IXP has spatially dispersed peering agreements and the sign of distance is negative, implies that while headquarters prefer localised peering agreements probably these are among neighbouring ISPs, so these may be scattered in peering groups.
4. Finally an IXP has spatially dispersed peering agreements and the sign for the distance in the regression is positive, this shows an industry where activity is dispersed but connected through valuable peering links across long distance
Each of these 4 possibilities might suggest a graph representation: connected dispersed clusters, unconnected dispersed clusters connected clustered clusters, unconnected connected clusters.
Empirical Specification of the Probit Model
We now explore these possible scenarios by specifying a binary probit model.
The dependent variable, the peering decision, is obtained from the IXP peering matrix, showing, in correspondence of each pair or providers, if either they are in a peering relationship (peering=1) or not (peering=0).
We introduce several independent variables to explain the peering decision. The influence of the geographic location on the peering decision, involving each pair of providers, is modeled by the geographic distance between them 8 . Moreover for each Internet provider we derived the set of Euro-IX members at which it participates; this information was used to devise a second set of variables. Firstly, the possibility of reputation effects in peering decisions (Titley, 1997) indicates that presumably a relevant quantity of traffic flows among that node. 8 We followed a two stage process to calculate the distance: we first individuated latitude and longitude for each ISP's headquarter, then we used the "Great Circle Distance Formula using decimal degrees" to calculate the distance between any couple of headquarters. The formula is given by dist(P1, P2) = 3963.0 * arccos[sin(lat1/57.2958) * sin(lat2/57.2958) + cos(lat1/57.2958) * cos(lat2/57.2958) * cos(lon2/57.2958 -lon1/57.2958)] 9 In order to obtain the relevant variables from the initial set of data, given by the peering matrixes for the Euro-IX members, we created several visual basic routines. 10 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a series of "instructions" that govern the transmission of packets over the Internet. The BGP establishes the paths that data packets will take through connected networks. The BGP is itself data, and by design nearly always take the same paths; this method (in-band where e has a standard normal distribution 1 and is independent of the explanatory variables x . Let Φ be its cumulative density function (cdf); then, it can be shown that
We are interested in the effect of the explanatory variable k x on the above response probability. In such a model, this effect is not entirely determined by Φ is a strictly increasing cdf, the sign of the partial effect is determined by the sign of j β . It is worth to notice, finally, that since the latent variable does not have a unit of measurement, the magnitude of the j β are not meaningful.
Estimation Results
In the following we introduce the probit model estimation results for AMS-IX, LINX, DE-CIX, VIX, ESPANIX and RONIX. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
The above table shows that three variables seem to consistently affect peering decision between a pair of providers. These are the hot potato and reputation effect, expressed by the number of IXPs that they are both member of, having a positive effect, and the difference in both size and traffic flows, respectively modeled through difference in the number of memberships at the Euro-IX IXPs and the difference in traffic flows (captured through the betweenness).
One of our most interesting findings is that the geographical distance seems to play a role that depends on the nature of the IXP morphology.
Indeed, if we consider IXPs exhibiting a random pattern about the peering agreement distribution (AMSIX, DECIX, LINX), the distance seems to have a negative effect on peering. The significance level is very high for both AMSIX and DECIX, while lower for LINX. This result also matches the result of the Moran's z value for LINX being much higher than those characterizing both AMSIX and DECIX.
While turning on the VIX, characterized by a clustered distribution, the geographical distance is still significant but with positive sign. Distance plays the opposite role on the likelihood of establishing bilateral peering agreements depending on the existing degree of clustering of the IXP. Finally, IXPs characterized by dispersed patterns of the peering agreements distributions distance does not seem to play a role.
The table below provides the partial effects calculated in correspondence of the mean values vector of the explanatory variables. We then investigated the possibility that distance still plays a role in the strategic interconnection decisions between providers. Indeed, the possibility of mutual control is argued to be important for the governance of relationships, such peering, characterized by highly asymmetric information.
Interestingly, geographical distance is significant in explaining peering within the equilibrium 'random' IXPs and the IXPs resulting instead clustered.
However, it seems to play a very different role depending on the pre-existing morphology. Within IXPs characterized by a random morphology, geographical distance has a negative effect on peering: this may indicate relevance for mutual knowledge and face-to-face contact in peering decisions.
When considering clustered IXPs, instead, the likelihood of peering seems to increase with the distance within the providers. From a dynamic point of view, this effect is likely to be cluster breaking in the long run, with the clustered morphology converging to the random equilibrium.
